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One of the most striking features of Classical Indian skepticism is the degree to which 
it provides intellectual delight. Ethan Mills offers an insightful treatment of each of 
the three pivotal figures he locates in this tradition, but he also succeeds in conveying 
that sense of delight, both in his sympathetic depictions of the tradition’s great 
skeptical arguments, and in his own creative interpretations of their significance. 
There are many points where I find Mills fully persuasive: for example, in his 
arguments to the effect that we cannot know the precise boundaries of our ignorance, 
and in his suggestion that skepticism can arise inevitably from an exaggerated 
emphasis on explicit justification. As a critic, however, I sense a duty to explore the 
more puzzling aspects of Mills’ approach, with the aim of clearing away some 
ambiguities and gaining a deeper appreciation of what it is that he is proposing. I 
should acknowledge that I come at the book from an odd angle, as a contemporary 
epistemologist with no more than an amateur’s grasp of the South Asian texts he is 
discussing. But in saying I read these texts as a contemporary epistemologist, I don’t 
mean to say that I aim to impose my contemporary epistemology upon them, as 
opposed to letting it be shaped and instructed by them. I certainly agree with Mills 
that we should not assume that the moves made by Classical Indian skeptics can be 
neatly captured with the existing vocabulary of contemporary Anglo-American 
epistemology; indeed, much of the reward for me in looking at these traditions lies in 
their potential to offer fresh philosophical paths, and correctives to bad habits I have 
picked up from the traditions in which I was educated, and Mills’ book has been eye-
opening in that regard. 
   At the heart of the book is a distinction between epistemological skepticism and 
skepticism about philosophy, motivating the project of reading the three pillars as 
strictly committed to the latter enterprise. In Mills’ framing of the contrast, 
epistemological skeptics have an agenda which may include advancing arguments 
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with conclusions which are “truth claims about knowledge, particularly whether and 
to what extent humans possess knowledge in general or in particular domains”; these  
claims are situated within properly philosophical theories about knowledge, and are 
aimed at the promotion of doubt or suspension of judgment as the normatively correct 
epistemic response on ordinary matters (see Mills 2018, xxiii). By contrast, his 
skeptics about philosophy take philosophy itself as a target, jousting against various 
specific philosophical theories without the ambition of establishing a positive rival 
theory of their own. In particular, they are not committed to any theory of knowledge, 
and their aims are better characterized as therapeutic than as doctrinal. This therapy is 
intended to extinguish our desire to form beliefs about philosophical matters, 
although, intriguingly enough, the therapy proceeds through the provision of 
abundant philosophical arguments, albeit arguments which do not establish 
philosophical conclusions, (see Mills 2018, xxvii). Mills is attracted to the notion that 
his three pillars are fighting against philosophy, rather than everyday practice: he 
does not see them as advocating a purge of epistemic vocabulary from its role in our 
daily lives, nor as resisting common sense judgments about such mundane matters as 
whether someone has seen a given cup. I wonder both about his proposed separation 
between the mundane and the philosophical and about the suggestion that the three 
pillars are ultimately anti-philosophical, as opposed to being reformers who want to 
demonstrate the futility of certain philosophical programs, in a manner well suited to 
direct us into new ways of thinking that are still properly and positively philosophical. 
  Mills is not alone in thinking that there could be some theoretically important 
separation between mundane and philosophical contexts. In his discussion of Jayarāśi, 
Mills suggests that the semantic contextualism of contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy also draws the kind of division that could be in play here, taking this 
program to be committed to a relevantly similar separation of contexts. His vision of 
the separation is as follows: “If one goes down the rabbit hole of epistemology, one 
will see that the whole enterprise of establishing pramāṇas is futile. If one avoids 
epistemology, then there is no problem at all—one can go on discussing knowledge in 
an everyday context. In the context of epistemology, epistemology self-destructs; in 
the context of everyday practice, there is no need for epistemology” (Mills 2018, 85-
6). I will take issue with the thought that contextualism should be read this way, but I 
want to be clear from the outset that Mills is not saying that Jayarāśi was explicitly 
propounding a contextualist semantics. Mills holds that contextualism, understood his 
way, provides a helpful model that can be adapted to illuminate what is going on in 
Jayarāśi’s text; in particular, Mills wants to show that the negative claims that 
Jayarāśi makes in epistemological contexts should not bar him from continuing to use 
epistemic vocabulary in mundane contexts.  
  This line of thought is elaborated later in the book, when Mills urges us to 
understand the kind of skepticism he finds promising in the light of something he 
characterizes as a revision of semantic contextualism. He writes: “Unlike 
contextualists such as David Lewis (1999) or Stewart Cohen (2000), I don’t think we 
need to see the same proposition (e.g. “S knows that p”) as true in one context and 
false in another. Rather, I’d say that the difference is between two different kinds of 
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knowledge: we might have shallow knowledge that “S knows that p” while 
simultaneously lacking deep knowledge that “S knows that p.” When we progress 
from shallow knowledge to deep knowledge, we are doing more than changing 
context, we are changing the subject.” The upshot, according to Mills, is that, “We 
may have a great deal of what I call shallow knowledge, but deep knowledge is 
difficult, if not impossible, for human beings to possess.  To put things more 
colloquially, we kind of know lots of things, but we don’t really know much of 
anything.” (Mills 2018, 180) 
  While Mills presents his change-of-subject approach as a correction to semantic 
contextualism, he may not be diverging from Lewis and Cohen as much as he thinks. 
First, although Cohen (2000) somewhat confusingly speaks of sentences rather than 
utterances, his contextualism does not hold that propositions about knowledge switch 
in truth value from one context to another: what changes is what is said, that is to say, 
what proposition is expressed in different contexts by an utterance of the form “S 
knows that p”. If a casual bystander says, “Smith knows that the flight stops in 
Chicago”, upon seeing Smith just glance at the itinerary, while Mary, for whom the 
Chicago layover is extremely important, says, “Smith does not know that the flight 
stops in Chicago,” then on Cohen’s theory the two speakers have not actually 
contradicted each other. The proposition that the causal bystander affirms is crucially 
different from the proposition that Mary denies. Because the casual bystander has a 
lower epistemic standards parameter than Mary does, the word “know” picks out a 
different property in the two contexts of attribution, although there are some 
commonalities in the property picked out by “know(s)” and its cognates across all 
contexts. The word always denotes a factive attitude, so the embedded proposition 
must be true (e.g. the flight must really stop in Chicago), and at least on Cohen’s 
theory, evidence is always required—so our subject Smith must have some evidence 
for p for any attribution of the form “Smith knows that p” to be true of him. What 
shifts between contexts of attribution is the amount of evidence needed, just as the 
absolute height needed to count as “tall” shifts when we are talking about “tall-for-a-
basketball-player” versus “tall-for-a-jockey”. As in Mills’ own proposal of a switch 
between “shallow knowledge” and “deep knowledge”, there is something like a 
change of topic between speakers in different contexts: there are many things we 
know-by-low-standards and very few things we know-by-high-standards. 
  The point that different propositions are expressed in different contexts is initially 
harder to see in Lewis’s “Elusive Knowledge” (1996), which starts by suggesting that 
knowledge itself seems to melt away as we shift into epistemological reflection, but 
the body of Lewis’s text maintains a focus on the rules for the evaluation of 
knowledge ascriptions, and the concluding paragraphs acknowledge that strictly 
speaking the entire discussion ought to have been formulated in a meta-linguistic 
fashion, in terms of variable standards for the evaluation of utterances involving 
“know(s)”, rather than variable standards for knowledge itself. By way of an apology 
for his informal and technically inaccurate presentation, Lewis observes that this 
semantic ascent will be tedious to execute. However tedious it might be to spell it out, 
for the contextualists, there is strictly speaking no such thing as “knowledge itself” 
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full-stop, but only a broad family of relations between subjects and propositions, from 
the lax to the most stringent, denoted by our verb “to know” (and presumably its 
cognates and translations). So, Lewis would be on board with the spirit of Mills’ idea 
that “shallow knowledge” is easy and “deep knowledge” is hard.  The point that 
different propositions are expressed by utterances of the form “S knows that p” 
becomes even clearer in more recent systematizations of contextualist theory, such as 
Keith DeRose’s (2009) The Case for Contextualism. 
  If the change-of-property point is a place where Mills is closer to contemporary 
contextualism than he realizes, there is another point where he is further away: he 
suggests that epistemology itself runs into trouble in high-standards contexts, and that 
one lesson of contextualism is that the philosopher should recognize that “the whole 
enterprise of establishing pramāṇas is futile”. This is an interesting suggestion. 
However, semantic contextualism on its own is a thesis about variability in the 
interpretation of epistemic vocabulary, and it is usually understood as leaving open 
the question of what theory of knowledge one might adopt. Lewis, Cohen and 
DeRose all advocate theories of knowledge. The pramāṇas they aim to establish are 
different: Lewis has an empiricist relevant alternatives theory, in which the 
contextually variable point is just the range of alternatives that must be excluded by 
one’s sensory experience and memories; Cohen has an internalist theory where 
context determines how much evidence is needed, and DeRose has an externalist 
tracking theory, where context fixes the range of possible worlds that will matter. For 
each, the definition or kind of condition that will properly be called “knowledge” 
remains fixed across all contexts (just as “tall” picks out “relatively great in vertical 
magnitude” in all contexts), but the ease of meeting this condition will vary (as “tall” 
does with the shifting implicit comparison class). In any event, contemporary 
contextualists will not agree that it is an upshot of their theory that, “in the context of 
epistemology, epistemology self-destructs”: for better or worse, they all offer positive 
theories of knowledge. 
  Now Mills may be right to suggest that contemporary contextualism still provides 
a model for the notion that “the project of establishing pramāṇas” is endangered in 
some contexts: in the most skeptical contexts, it may not be possible for a speaker to 
assert the positive epistemological theory that is supposed to apply to all contexts, and 
it is interesting in this context to remember that Śrī Harṣa’s opening exhortation 
specifically promises to teach techniques that will stop one’s adversaries from being 
able to set forth their positions in speech (Śrīharṣa, c.1100/1986, 3). However, each 
contextualist’s theory of knowledge is still supposed to be true in these contexts, and 
expressible from other positions (just as—to take an example of Lewis’s—it is 
sometimes true of us that we are now silent, although we are unable to speak truly in 
those contexts by saying out loud that we are being silent). Meanwhile, unless we are 
stuck talking to someone very well trained by Śrī Harṣa, talking about epistemology 
does not by itself switch us to the most skeptical contexts: epistemologists can for 
example, just focus on different things people might say in an airport, and try to make 
sense of the way we would expect them to use the common verb “to know”. If 
contemporary contextualists are right, the epistemological truths of any given context 
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cannot always be expressed in that context, but this is the sort of outcome we should 
already have recognized from the case of the silent person, a case which doesn’t turn 
on epistemological issues. So, Mills’ suggestion that “in the context of everyday 
practice, there is no need for epistemology” is quite contrary to the spirit of 
contemporary contextualism (see especially DeRose 2009, ch.2 on the extent to 
which contextualism is motivated by a desire to save and explain the empirical data of 
ordinary talk involving “know(s)” and its cognates). Whether contextualists really 
have satisfactory explanations of the daily use of “know(s)” is another issue, and one 
on which Śrī Harṣa may be able to contribute. 
  If the position that Mills attributes to his three pillars is out of line with 
contextualism, this is not necessarily a strike against Mills, nor against Classican 
Indian philosophy: perhaps it is the contemporary contextualists who should be 
worried. From here on, I’m going to focus on just one of the three pillars, Śrī Harṣa, 
because I think he’s the one who creates the most trouble (and excitement). Even if I 
think contextualists like Lewis would balk at this result, Mills may well be right that 
Śrī Harṣa shows that their project of establishing pramāṇas really is futile.  Where I 
am going to part company with Mills is on the point of whether epistemology should 
be equated with the project of “establishing pramāṇas”: I think that Śrī Harṣa can be 
read as actually doing epistemology, and not as destroying epistemology, even as he 
burns down the project of giving a reductive analysis of knowledge.  
  First, a point of agreement with Mills: like him, I admire the intuitive cases that 
Śrī Harṣa deploys against various efforts to give reductive analyses of knowledge. I 
agree that the person who mistakes fog for smoke does not know that there is fire on 
the hill, and that the gambler does not know that there happen to be five shells in the 
closed fist, however confident and correct these subjects might be. I agree with Mills 
(and with Śrī Harṣa, if I am reading him correctly) that philosophers have not 
succeeded in repairing the analysis of knowledge by adding explicit conditions to 
exclude accidental correctness, and I think Śrī Harṣa does a good job of showing that 
various efforts to do this either run too wide (admitting as knowledge cases that 
clearly aren’t) or drop into circularity, invoking the very notion they promised to 
explain. What did Śrī Harṣa mean to accomplish by running through this list of failed 
efforts to analyze knowledge, given that at the end he supplies no superior analysis of 
his own? One could read the progression in the text as a deliberate demonstration of 
the failure of the method of reductive analysis, and I think that Mills himself is on 
board with the idea that this method is going to fail, especially for targets like 
knowledge: he approvingly cites Williamson’s pessimistic induction for the 
conclusion that we will not succeed in analysing ‘knows’ reductively, in terms that do 
not presuppose what we seek to define (Mills 2018, 173). I expect Mills and I both 
read Śrī Harṣa as delivering a heaping platter of inductive evidence for this 
pessimistic induction. We could also both emphasize Śrī Harṣa’s open declarations of 
war on the analytic method, such as his cheerful provocation, “Let our opponent who 
imagines that he can define things come forward with his definitions. He will fail; for 
we shall at once point out objections to each definition he attempts.” (Śrīharṣa, 
c.1100/1986, 40) One question is whether we can move from these denunciations and 
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demonstrations of failure of definitions to a broader skepticism about philosophy. 
After approving of Williamson’s pessimistic induction argument for the prospects of 
analyzing knowledge, Mills goes on to say that he himself “would apply such a 
pessimistic induction to most other philosophical goals as well” (Mills 2018, 173). 
My own sense is that we could gain support for this blanket pessimism from a thinker 
like Śrī Harṣa only if we had an exaggerated sense of the importance of definitions in 
philosophy: I think we can accept Śrī Harṣa’s attacks on reductive analyses without 
becoming more broadly pessimistic about philosophical goals. So my own inclination 
is to read Śrī Harṣa in a manner somewhat closer to Jonardon Ganeri’s, although I 
don’t know that I’d go all the way to Ganeri’s view that “Śrī Harṣa is no skeptic” 
(Ganeri 2017, 522). In Ganeri’s view, Śrī Harṣa mainly aims to deliver a strong 
methodological lesson with his negative arguments: his method of refutation is 
supposed to demonstrate that our concepts are fully usable without definitions or 
indeed without any grounding discoverable through definitions. This is an interesting 
and innovative new type of philosophy, not a form of skepticism about philosophy. 
  What is philosophy if it isn’t a project of giving reductive definitions? We can go 
back to the case of knowledge. Śrī Harṣa is sometimes read as excluding not only 
reductive definitions, as Williamson does, but also excluding views in which the 
targets of philosophical interest are unanalyzable primitives. So Nilanjan Das, for 
example, reads Śrī Harṣa as excluding a view like Williamson’s in his attack on the 
effort to define knowledge simply and non-reductively, as“that cognition which 
belongs to the class of pramā” (Śrīharṣa, c.1100/1986, 162) (as discussed in Das 
2018, p.20). I find this passage in the Buffet of Destruction somewhat more 
ambiguous: it seems to me that Śrī Harṣa may be really objecting to the idea that we 
can construct a theory or recipe that experts can use to operationalize knowledge-
spotting in some automatic or unproblematic way, as detection of the property of 
knowledge. It seems to me that Śrī Harṣa is leaving open and indeed directing 
attention to the possibility that there is some primitive and unanalyzable (or 
undefinable) phenomenon of knowledge itself; indeed, his arguments about the 
accuracy of our knowledge-spotting seem to suggest to me that he must accept this 
phenomenon, at some level. The arguments take it for granted that sometimes there 
really are (at some level) instances of knowledge that are mistakenly judged 
incorrectly (so knowledge is not automatically self-disclosing). But the qualification 
‘at some level’ is important. Whether any such phenomena are ultimately real in Śrī 
Harṣa’s eyes is I think a question about the depth of his skepticism, and a question 
which is very hard to answer. But to the extent that we take seriously his apparently 
positive philosophical pronouncements about the ultimately illusory character of the 
Universe, and especially his metaphysically ambitious positive remarks about Non-
duality, it seems to me that we might want to read Śrī Harṣa as carving out a role for 
philosophy that isn’t just a matter of therapeutically releasing ourselves from the 
philosophical desire to define. 
  I agree strongly with Mills’ suggestion that Śrī Harṣa is warning us against the 
pursuit of definitional justifications, but I wonder about whether he thinks that such 
justifications are all that philosophy can ultimately pursue, condemned to fail in some 
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instructive or therapeutic way in that pursuit. Even if Śrī Harṣa’s descriptive claims 
about awareness of ordinary contingent matters like the number of flowers on a 
branch are ultimately undercut by his skeptical reasoning about the illusory character 
of the universe, I want to find a way of understanding his attitude to philosophy that 
will make sense of his positive philosophical claims about non-duality, and above all, 
of the imperatives and exhortations in his text. I think Mills is right to see Śrī Harṣa as 
drawing a distinction between shallow and deep knowledge, but I think his version of 
shallow knowledge applies to what happens in time (or is subject to “production”), 
and is of what “lies within the sphere of illusion” (77), where deep knowledge 
concerns what is “essentially ‘non-producible’, i.e. eternal” (77), and non-dual, one 
with Brahman (77-8). I take this to be a form of skepticism quite interestingly 
different from what we find either in Ancient Greece or on the contemporary scene. 
And finally, I cannot help but hear Śrī Harṣa as a true believer in philosophy when he 
writes: “I, therefore, can only call upon you, however much you may hanker after the 
enticing glamour of illusion, to accept with due faith this Non-duality as it is set 
before you fully supported by arguments agreeing with your own principles of correct 
reasoning.” (79) The passage goes on to counsel direct intuition of the Highest 
Reality, but I think philosophical argument is supposed to play a more than 
therapeutic role in getting us there. 
  In closing, however, I should acknowledge that whether someone is reforming or 
rejecting philosophy depends in part on what we mean by ‘philosophy’, so some 
aspect of this dispute may be merely verbal. Meanwhile, Mills and I are certainly in 
agreement that the larger enterprise that his three pillars are engaged in—whether it is 
pure philosophy, or some mixture of that and a form of therapy that makes use of but 
transcends philosophy—is a deeply intriguing one.  
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